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PROF. KEVIN H. GOVERN

Smart Power for Hard Problems:
The Role of Special Operation Forces
Strengthening the Rule of Law
and Human Rights in Africa
ABSTRACT:
This article will assess the roles and responsibilities
of Special Operations Forces (SOF) within the newly
created U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) as an active
proponent of a so-called “smart power” national security
strategy. In particular, it will outline the economic,
political, and military challenges faced in Africa;
specifically, how and why SOCAFRICA is the U.S. force
of choice for promoting human rights and rule of law in
Africa. With the goals of the U.S. military in mind,
questions will necessarily arise as to “what success looks
like” for both the U.S. and African nations, and the roles of
each in joint and combined civil–military initiatives. The
concluding comments reflect on how these forces must
model “what right looks like,” and provide specific
modeling failures, and the consequences when that
modeling did not take place.
AUTHOR:
The author is an Associate Professor of Law at Ave
Maria School of Law, Naples, FL, a Law and Public Policy
Instructor for the California University of Pennsylvania,
and is an Advisory Board Member and affiliated Faculty
for The University of Pennsylvania Law School Center for
Ethics and the Rule of Law. He began his legal career as
an Army judge advocate, serving 20 years at every echelon
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I.
Special
Operations
Command
(SOCAFRICA) and “Smart Power”

—Africa

The U.S.’ AFRICOM just celebrated its fifth
anniversary in October 2012 of “standing up” operations
and has progressed well beyond “initial operating
capability”1 to act as the U.S. Department of Defense’s
(DoD’s) newest regional unified combatant command2 in a
region of tremendous potential as well as turmoil.
AFRICOM was conceived to work closely with the African
Union (AU),3 other regional African institutions, and
individual nations in order to “provide unique ‘valueadded’ capabilities to enhance already existing U.S. and

1

U.S. AFRICOM PUB. AFF. OFF., U.S. Africa Command Reaches
Initial Operating Capability, U.S. AFR. COMMAND (Oct. 1, 2007),
http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1462.
2
At the time of this chapter’s writing there were 10 Unified Combatant
Commands (UCCs) within the U.S. Department of Defense; four were
organized as functional commands with specific capabilities like
Special Operations, as in the case of USSOCOM, and six geographical
commands with regional responsibilities like U.S. Africa Command
(USAFRICOM). See U.S. Dep’t. of Def., U.S. Joint Publication No. 102, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, RA.DEFENSE.GOV, 384 (2001),
http://ra.defense.gov/documents/rtm/jp1_02.pdf (“unified combatant
command — See unified command. (JP 1); unified command — A
command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander
and composed of significant assigned components of two or more
Military Departments that is established and so designated by the
President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and
assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called
unified combatant command. See also combatant command;
subordinate unified command. (JP 1).”).
3
Jim Lobe, Africa to Get Its Own U.S. Military Command, ANTIWAR
(Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=10443.
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international programs.”4 As “the military’s first ‘smart
power’ command … [AFRICOM has] no assigned troops
and no headquarters in Africa itself, and one of its two top
deputies is a seasoned American diplomat.”5 This requires
AFRICOM to continue to develop integrated strategies
(civil–military), resource bases (economic, political, and
military) and tool kits (military and diplomatic capabilities)
to achieve American objectives with an “approach that
underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also
invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at
all levels to expand American influence and establish the
legitimacy of American actions.”6
Driven by strategic necessity, and policy
considerations of retaining a minimal “footprint” on the
African continent, the U.S. military has quietly adapted its
procedures to primarily employ SOF with great
effectiveness, in conjunction with selected conventional
forces, to advance AFRICOM initiatives.7 At the time of
this article’s writing, AFRICOM’s only permanent base in
Africa was Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, with numerous
ongoing unclassified and classified missions including
rotating troops and task forces of some 3,200 troops in
Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA);
including 300 Special Operations personnel working on
4

U.S. AFRICOM PUB AFF. OFF., supra note 2, (quoting General
William E. “Kip” Ward, former Commander, AFRICOM).
5
Eric Schmitt, Libya Crisis Thrusts U.S. Africa Command Into
Leadership Role, N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar. 22, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/world/africa/23command.html?_r
=1&pagewanted=print.
6
Richard L. Armitage et al., CSIS Commission on Smart Power, A
Smarter, More Secure America, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INT’L STUD., 7, (2007),
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf.
7
Govern, supra note 1, at 294.
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organizing raids and strategizing the drone strikes of eight
or more Predator drones “flown” by pilots from thousands
of miles away, and eight F-15E fighter-bombs for other
strike operations.8 Lemonnier has been described as part of
a "constellation” of hush-hush [US] drone, commando or
intelligence facilities in East Africa [including] Ethiopia,
Kenya, Somalia and the island nation of the Seychelles."9
While DOD has not confirmed or denied those other
locations, Niger's Ambassador to the US, Maman Sidikou,
told the media in early 2013 that his government has agreed
to let US drones operate from its territory, a largely desert

8

Craig Whitlock, Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations,
WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2012, at C4,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-usbase-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines.
For details of the U.S. Government’s “acknowledged,” unclassified site
locations in Africa, see LAUREN PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
34003, AFRICA COMMAND: U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE ROLE
OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN AFRICA 9-10 (2010). Ploch identified that
“AFRICOM’s other Forward Operating Site is on the United
Kingdom’s Ascension Island in the south Atlantic. U.S. military
facilities in Rota, Spain; Sigonella, Italy; Aruba, Lesser Antilles; Souda
Bay, Greece; and Ramstein, Germany, serve as logistic support
facilities. The U.S. military also has access to a number of foreign air
bases and ports in Africa and has established “bare-bones” facilities
maintained by local troops in several locations. The U.S. military used
facilities in Kenya in the 1990s to support its intervention in Somalia
and continues to use them today to support counterterrorism activities.
DOD refers to these facilities as ‘lily pads,’ or Cooperative Security
Locations (CSLs), and has access to locations in Algeria, Botswana,
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra
Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.” Id.
9
Id.; Craig Whitlock & Greg Miller, U.S. assembling secret drone
bases in Africa, Arabian Peninsula, officials say, WASH. POST (Sept.
20, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-0920/world/35273162_1_undeclared-drone-wars-seychelles-presidentjames-michel-unmanned-aircraft.
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nation on the eastern border of Mali.10 According to U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Commander,
Admiral (ADM) McRaven, Special Operators will be
partnering with the State Department and other federal
agencies, as well as friendly foreign militaries, on
“nonkinetic”11 programs to prevent extremists from
capitalizing on political discontent, ethnic rivalries and
economic frustration to fuel their strategy of terror and
violence in places like Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and
countries bordering the Sahara Desert.12

10

Jamie Crawford & Chris Lawrence, U.S. to base surveillance drones
in Niger, ambassador says, CNN (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/29/us/niger.
11
See, e.g., Donald P. Wright et al., ON POINT II, TRANSITION TO THE
NEW CAMPAIGN: THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM MAY 2003 –JANUARY 2005 (Combat Studies Institute Press,
2008), available at
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps96027/OnPointII.pdf (“[F]rom the
very beginning of the full spectrum campaign [in Iraq], US forces also
mounted broader efforts to build popular support for the new Iraqi
Government and the Coalition project in Iraq. These operations,
sometimes called ‘nonkinetic’ operations, concentrated on the
reconstruction of the Iraqi infrastructure, the establishment of
representative government, the training of ISF, and general efforts to
improve the quality of life for the population.”)
12
John M. Doyle, Special Operations Forces Face Growing Problems
in a Shrinking World, INST. FOR DEF. AND GOV’T ADVANCEMENT
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.idga.org/unconventionalwarfare/articles/special-operations-forces-face-growing
problemsin/&mac=idga_oi_featured_2011&utm_source=idga.org&utm
_medium=email&utm_campaign=idgaoptin&utm_content=11/13/12;
See Admiral William H. McRaven, Posture Statement of Admiral
William H. McRaven, USN Commander, United States Special
Operations Command Before The 112th Congress Senate Armed
Services Committee, ARMED-SERVICES.SENATE.GOV (Mar. 6,
2012),
http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2012/03%20March/
McRaven%2003-06-12.pdf [hereinafter Posture Statement].
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Inheriting the range of special operations missions
from Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR),13
and complimenting AFRICOM’s conventional force
capability, AFRICOM “stood up” a “theater Special
Operations Command for Africa,” (SOCAFRICA) to
support the Theater Security Cooperation Program14 with
planning and responding to real world contingencies in
fifty-three countries and more than 13 million square
miles.15 Also on October 1, 2008, SOCAFRICA assumed
responsibility for the Special Operations Command and
Control Element—Horn of Africa,16 and on May 15, 2009,
SOCAFRICA assumed responsibility for Joint Special
Operations Task Force Trans-Sahara (JSOTFTS)—the SOF
component of Operation Enduring Freedom—TransSahara.17
The primary focus of the command is on SOF
missions that develop African partner capacity, provide
assistance, and support theater security cooperation
objectives.18 For SOCAFRICA, however, as with the
13

See, e.g., SPEC. OPERATIONS COMMAND EUR.,
http://www.soceur.eucom.mil/default.asp.
14
Marina Malenic, Pentagon Begins Constituting Special Operations
Command to Support AFRICOM Efforts, DEF. DAILY (Oct. 9, 2008),
http://www.defensedaily.com/publications/dd/4271.html.
15
Bryan Purtell, Haas Assumes Command of Special Operations
Command Africa, U.S. AFR. COMMAND (Aug. 25, 2009),
http://www.africom.mil/NEWSROOM/Article/6829/haas-assumescommand-of-special-operations-command.
16
Max Blumenfeld, Training in Trans-Sahara Africa, U.S. AFR.
COMMAND (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/7896/training-in-transsahara-africa.
17
Id.
18
See Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA),
GLOBALSECURITY,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/socafrica.htm (last
modified Apr. 13, 2013).
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remainder of AFRICOM assets, the challenge is and will
remain that its forces must pursue not a unilateral military
presence or bilateral military– to–military cooperation, but
a “whole of government approach[,]” which “presents a
tension between the importance of representing U.S.
activities in Africa as peaceful and respectful of African
national sovereignty.”19 Collectively and individually,
African nations will continue to raise many challenges
surrounding the balance between military power, civil
society, and the rule of law.20 With the goals of the U.S.
military in mind, questions will necessarily arise as to
“what success looks like” for both the U.S. and African
nations, and the roles of each in joint and combined civil`–
military initiatives.21
II.
The Economic, Political, and Military Challenges
Faced in Africa
The 2004 U.S. National Military Strategy
significantly described Africa as lying in “an ‘arc of
instability’ stretching from the Western Hemisphere,
through Africa and the Middle East and extending to

19

John Tierney, Chairman, Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign
Affairs, Keynote Address at Center for Advanced Defense Studies
Conference: AFRICOM: An Independent Review for the New
Administration
(Oct.
28,
2009),
available
at
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&
task=view&id=4626&Itemid=55.
20
Govern, supra note 1, at 294.
21
Id.
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Asia.”22 Additionally, and similarly troubling, is the
observation that “[t]here are areas in this arc that serve as
breeding grounds for threats to [U.S.] interests.”23
Indicative of that regional instability, the U.S. had become
“increasingly involved in Africa since the end of the Cold
War,” with over “[twenty] U.S. military operations in
Africa between 1990 and 2000 and another [ten plus] since
2000.”24 As ADM McRaven identified to Congress, the
U.S. continues to confront a number of challenges
from “insurgents, transnational terrorists, criminal
organizations, nation states and their proxies;” he
22

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A STRATEGY FOR TODAY; A VISION
FOR
TOMORROW
5
(2004),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf. The 2011
National Military Strategy (NMS) less pessimistically addressed
Africa’s “critical states where the threat of terrorism could pose a threat
to our homeland and interests[,] . . . violent extremism in the Horn of
Africa, particularly Somalia and the Trans-Sahel[,] . . . the security
threat to innocent civilians[, and the need to] identify and encourage
states and regional organizations that have demonstrated a leadership
role to continue to contribute to Africa's security. We will help
facilitate the African Union’s and the Regional Economic
Communities’ development of their military capacity, including the
African Stand-by Force, to address the continent’s many security
challenges.” JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE NATIONAL MILITARY
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: REDEFINING
AMERICA’S MILITARY LEADERSHIP 12 (2011), available at
http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/201102/020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf.
23
Id.
24
See, e.g., Denine Walters, AFRICOM: Newsworthiness and Current
Operations, CONSULTANCY AFR. INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 1, 2009),
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?optio
n=com_content&view=article&id=300&Itemid=202. See also Brett D.
Schaefer & Mackenzie Eaglen, Clarifying the Future of AFRICOM,
THE HERITAGE FOUND. n.3 (Sep. 27, 2007),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Africa/wm1644.cfm (citing Otto
Sieber, Africa Command: Forecast For The Future, DTIC (Jan. 2007),
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA519742).
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specified, that these opponents will try to exploit gaps in
U.S. foreign and defense policies that were developed in a
more predictable world, with their use of cyberspace as a
battlefield making them more adaptable as they seek new
ways to recruit, train, finance, and operate.25 In Africa and
elsewhere, “the strategic environment is changing —
quickly and constantly.”26 At greatest risk in Africa are
“weakly governed spaces [that] provide favorable operating
environments for violent extremism, piracy, and trafficking
of humans, weapons, and drugs.”27 Similarly, numerous
other nations with duly constituted governments employ
cronyism and favoritism to manipulate the organs of law
enforcement and judicial systems, or flaunt international
efforts to advance and promote justice. Rule of law and
human rights challenges include, but are not limited to, the
following in some twenty-first century African nations,
governmental entities, organizations, and cultures:
Undeveloped
economies,
with limited resource bases
and insufficient employment
and income opportunities for
large segments of the
25

Posture Statement, supra note 13.
Id.
27
2010 POSTURE STATEMENT U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, U.S.
AFR. COMMAND, (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://www.africom.mil/Content/CustomPages/ResearchPage/pdfFiles/
USAFRICOM2010PostureStatement.pdf. In his March 9, 2010
testimony before Congress, the then-commander of AFRICOM
provided an overview of the strategic environment in Africa, explained
AFRICOM’s strategic approach, and showed how security cooperation
efforts promote stability in support of U.S. foreign policy and national
security objectives. See id. It is noteworthy that these Annual Posture
Statements seldom, if ever, include “metrics” related to “measures of
success,” identifying instead, anecdotal instances of mission successes
and efficacy. See id.
26
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population,
resulting
widespread poverty;28

in

High population growth rates
further strain the natural
environment
and
local
resources while intensifying
competition for resources;29
Ethnic diversity or regional
factionalism promoting local
or
particularistic
identifications,
while
hindering the development of
a national identification;30
Ethnic or class politics
involving competition among
leaders of different language,
cultural,
or
regional
populations
for
state
positions of political and
economic power with the
spoils of victory going to
supporters;31
Lack of regime legitimacy, as
those large segments of the
28

Paul J. Magnarella, Preventing Interethnic Conflict and Promoting
Human Rights through More Effective Legal, Political, and Aid
Structures: Focus on Africa, 23 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 327 (1993),
cited with authority in Paul J. Magnarella, Achieving Human Rights in
Africa, AFRICA STUDIES QUARTERLY, 4(2):2,
http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i2a2.htm.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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population not culturally or
politically affiliated with the
ruling elite and not sharing in
the spoils, refuse to recognize
the regime as legitimate;32
Resort to military or police
force to maintain power by
suppressing
political
opponents and disgruntled
civilians;33
Violation of economic, civil,
and political rights by the
regime on the pretext of
"national security;"34 and
Openly mocking human
rights and democracy, aside
from
corruption
and
complicity in criminal and
terroristic movements.35
What should success look like for SOCAFRICA
and conventional force engagement of African forces and
governments? According to the House of Representatives’
yearly assessment of AFRICOM, national security is a
stable environment “where education and public health
efforts, improvements in the rule of law, and the reduction
of corruption can significantly increase a government’s
32

Id.
Id.
34
Id.
35
See, e.g., Afr. Action and Foreign Policy in Focus Staff, Africa
Policy Outlook 2010, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (Jan. 22, 2010),
http://www.fpif.org/articles/africa_policy_outlook_2010.
33
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ability to combat these new threats.” In summation,
AFRICOM’s “foremost mission is to help Africans achieve
their own security” and to support African leadership
efforts,36 yet, “they will welcome help in building strong,
effective and professional forces.” 37
III.
Surveying SOCAFRICA Efforts to Promote
Human Rights and Rule of Law
Part of the SOF “smart power” approach to Africa
will involve a mix of direct and indirect approaches to
promote stability and security, advancing human rights, and
the rule of law. In advancing rule of law principles in
Africa, we might look to what the U.S. Department of State
(DoS) has attempted to define for Congress as notions of
rule of law the U.S. encourages and promotes:
While there is no commonly agreed upon definition
for the rule of law, we take it to mean a broad spectrum of
activities including a constitution, legislation, a court
system and courthouses, a judiciary, police, lawyers and
legal assistance, due process procedures, prisons, a
commercial code, and anticorruption activities. To
successfully implement an emerging rule of law, these
activities must proceed somewhat sequentially and not

36

John J. Kruzel, Pentagon Official Describes AFRICOM’s Mission,
Dispels Misconceptions, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Aug. 3, 2007),
http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=46931.
37
Judith Snyderman, AFRICOM Helps African Nations Build Their
Own Secure Future, NAVY (Apr. 10, 2008, 11:35 AM),
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=52478.
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randomly.38
According to ADM McRaven, the direct approach
will remain a hallmark capability for SOF in order to
provide the necessary means to disrupt this threat, while it
ultimately only buys time and space for the indirect
approach and broader governmental elements to take
effect.39 Less well known but decisive in importance, “the
indirect approach includes empowering host nation forces,
providing appropriate assistance to humanitarian agencies,
and engaging key populations; these long-term efforts
increase partner capabilities to generate sufficient security
and rule of law, address local needs, and advance ideas that
discredit and defeat the appeal of violent extremism.”40
As an effort to advance U.S.–African cooperation and the
rule of law in African states, the first Africa Military Legal
Conference hosted by AFRICOM concluded on May 21,
2010, at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping
Training Center in Accra, Ghana. This conference brought
together legal experts from fifteen African nations to
discuss common challenges, including military justice and

38

Howard J. Krongard, House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations: Testimony of Howard J. Krongard Inspector
General U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of
Governors, OIG.STATE.GOV (Oct. 18, 2005), available at
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/55371.pdf. Note: the
context of this testimony before Congress was ongoing rule of law
initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq. Domestically, as well as
internationally, it is far from settled how to define “rule of law,” let
alone how to bring it about. See, e.g., Kevin Govern, Rethinking Rule
of Law Efforts in Iraq, JURIST FORUM (Feb. 26, 2007),
http://jurist.org/forumy/2007/02/rethinking-rule-of-law-efforts-iniraq.php.
39
Posture Statement, supra note 13.
40
Id.
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maritime law, and counter-narcotics authorities.41 Major
Joy Primoli of 17th Air Force (Air Forces Africa) and
Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Tuckey of U.S. Army Africa,
led a discussion about the U.S. military justice system and
discussed challenges that common law countries face in
applying military disciplinary rules to maintain good order
and discipline while ensuring that unlawful command
influence does not corrupt the system.42 Countries using
civilian justice systems for military offenses discussed
challenges in case processing, including the lack of
resources to dispense timely justice.43
SOF and conventional forces have been involved in
promoting, as well as conducting in Africa and elsewhere,
the International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program that provides funds for international personnel to
attend U.S. military professional training programs.44 The
IMET program “specifically targets current and future
military and civilian leadership in African nations” and
“exposes foreign students to U.S. professional military
organizations and procedures and the manner in which
military organizations function under civilian control.”45
AFRICOM highlights that its IMET programs introduce
students to “elements of U.S. democracy such as the U.S.
judicial system, legislative oversight, free speech, equality
issues, and U.S. commitment to human rights” and
41

Kathleen A. Duignan, Successful Completion of First Africa Military
Legal Conference, U.S. AFR. COMMAND (June 4, 2010),
http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=4520&lang=0.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
U.S. AFRICOM PUB. AFF. OFF., Newsroom Documents March 2012,
U.S. AFR. COMMAND, Fact Sheet: International Military Education
and Training (Jan. 2012),
http://www.africom.mil/NEWSROOM/Document/8841 [hereinafter
Fact Sheet: Int’l Military Edu. and Training].
45
Id.
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promotes force interoperability through “IMET’s
mandatory English-language proficiency requirement.”46
Of no small significance “IMET training graduates fill key
leadership positions in military of many African nations.”47
There is also irony in this observation, given that Malian
coup leader Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo received
extensive IMET training in the United States between 2004
and 2010 before leading a military coup of his nation in
2012.48 Funding for U.S. Africa Command IMET recipient
countries in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 was $21.6 million.49
Projected funding for FY 2012 is $20.4 million.50 In FY
2011, 1,292 students from forty-seven partner nations
throughout Africa participated in IMET-funded training
and educational opportunities.51 With IMET, as with other
development and assistance programs, it is the sense of
Congress that if a country does “not cooperate with the
United States on terrorism or narcotics enforcement, is a
gross violator of the human rights of its citizens, or is
engaged in conflict or spends excessively on its military,”
they will be ineligible to participate in U.S. funded
programs.52
Other examples of the indirect approach are SOF’s
contributions supporting interagency diplomacy and
development efforts.
Currently, Military Information
Support Teams (MIST) and Regional Information Support
Teams (RIST) support the Department of State by
augmenting and broadening their public diplomacy
46

Id.
Id.
48
See Adam Nossiter, Leaders of Mali’s Military Coup Seem to have
Uncertain Grasp on Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012, at A8.
49
Fact Sheet: Int’l Military Educ. and Training, supra note 45.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See, e.g., Sense Of The Congress Regarding Comprehensive Debt
Relief For The World’s Poorest Countries, 19 U.S.C. § 3731 (2000).
47
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efforts.53 MIST elements are requested by U.S. Chiefs of
Mission and work under their direction to blend the
embassy’s Mission Strategic Plan and the Geographic
Combatant Commander’s (GCC) Theater Campaign Plan.
SOF elements in AFRICOM and elsewhere also support
interagency development efforts by deploying civil–
military support elements (CMSE) to address refugees,
displaced persons, populations at risk, and humanitarian or
disaster assistance.54 In addition to their work in the TransSahel, “CMSEs are engaged in seventeen countries and are
forecasted to expand to twenty countries in FY 2013 and
more than thirty countries by FY 2017” to “support
population-focused indirect approaches to combat violent
extremism.”55
The U.S. Department of State, Africa Bureau has
administered various peacekeeping capacity-building
assistance programs since the mid-1990s: the 1996 African
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) program from 1996
53

U.S. AFRICOM PUB. AFF. OFF., Newsroom Documents March 2012,
U.S. AFR. COMMAND Fact Sheet: Military Information Support Team
(MIST), (July 19, 2012)
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=
1&ved=0CC0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.africom.mil%2Ffile
.asp%3FpdfID%3D20100719122755&ei=_ueiULefJ66M0QGPmIGID
Q&usg=AFQjCNFm_tlWjVxtEyL5Le4OF5TluV3Ozw&cad=rja;
AFRICOM POSTURE STATEMENT: Ward Reports Annual Testimony
to Congress, AFRICOM PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://www.africom.mil/NEWSROOM/Article/7245/africom-posturestatement-ward-reports-annual-test.
54
See Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF –TS),
GLOBALSECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oefts.htm, (last modified Jan. 24, 2013).
55
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 and
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through 2004 evolved into the African Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) in
2004, then into the Global Peace Operations Initiative
(GPOI) in 2005.56 The ACRI was designed, according to
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, “[t]o enhance the
capacity of African partner nations to effectively participate
in multinational peace support operations,” or in other
words, to improve the training and effectiveness of African
military forces.57 The goal of these programs has been “to
increase the capabilities of these militaries in areas such as
human rights, interaction with civil society, international
law, military staff skills, and small unit operations.”58
According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Vicki
56

See Africa Crisis Response Initiative, GLOBAL SECURITY,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/acri.htm (last visited Jan.
31, 2013); see also NINA SERAFINO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
32773, THE GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE: BACKGROUND
AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2009). Serafino notes on this
transmogrification of Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program
(ACOTA) that “[b]efore mid-2004, the United States provided
peacekeeping capacity-building assistance to foreign militaries
primarily under two programs, the African Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) and its predecessor
program, and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities
program (EIPC). Both ACOTA and EPIC have been subsumed under
the [Global Peace Operations Initiative] GPOI budget line. ACOTA is
still the term used to refer to the Africa component of GPOI, however,
and is implemented by the State Department’s Africa Bureau. Overall
responsibility for GPOI rests with the State Department Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis
(PM/PPA). (Information about GPOI is available at
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi.) PM/PPA works closely with
DOD offices to plan and carry out the program.” Id.
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Huddleston, “[b]y training professional military units that
respect civilian control, these militaries become important
contributors to stability and respect for the rule of law,”
while AFRICOM’s exercises “provide opportunities to
African partners to continue perfecting their professional
abilities.”59
Huddleston said such training consists of
international standards on human rights, including respect
for the rule of law, tolerance, and women’s rights.60
SOF pursuing ACOTA and other missions must be
conscious of unique and intensifying politico-military “turf
issues” and human rights concerns in Africa, since “U.S.
military resources and projects are crossing ministerial
lines across the continent.”61 Retired Foreign Service
Officer Robert Gribben points to the theoretical “key local
client for AFRICOM” as being the host Ministry of
Defense, yet the additional realities are that “U.S. military
resources already go to projects in ministries of water
development, women’s affairs, health, [interior, and]
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Africa Command, U.S. AFR. COMMAND (Feb. 18, 2008),
http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1663 (“There are a number
of pieces of legislation -- one of them for example is the Leahy
Amendment, which requires human rights vetting of every single
individual we train. Even if we’re training a large unit, every individual
in that unit has to be vetted as best we can with the information that we
have for human rights violations to anyone that there is even the
smallest bit of suspicion about is removed from the training program.”);
See also. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-133 (1996) (discussing
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aviation.”62 This means it is not enough for SOF to vet
military compliance with human rights considerations and
promote military capabilities; they must also do so for
civilian ministries.
SOCAFRICA and other component commands and
AFRICOM assets must integrate their efforts with the AU,
a key partner, despite the fact that the AU faces a crisis of
legitimacy such that “[t]he AU is being judged on whether
it can and will respond effectively to situations of armed
conflict [under the provisions of the AU Constitutive
Act].”63 The AU Constitutive Act states that the Union has
the right to intervene “in a Member State pursuant to a
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances,
namely war crimes, genocide[,] and crimes against
humanity.”64 They must support AU’s initiatives to build
legitimacy and the rule of law, including the “alphabet
soup” of allied coalitions, such as: Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI), Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
(ATAP), Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP), East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI),
ACOTA, and IMET, the African Coastal Security Program,
Foreign Military Financing, the AU Standby Force, the
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center,
the Military Personnel Exchange Program, the Regional
Defense Combat Terrorism (CT) Fellowship Program, and
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the National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program.65
Just as the AU is “being judged on whether the presence of
AU or regional peacekeeping forces can resolve complex
peace support or enforcement operations,” so too will
SOCAFRICA and other AFRICOM assets be judged.66
The primary thrust of U.S. targeted killings, particularly
through drone strikes, has been on al-Qaeda and Taliban
leadership networks in Afghanistan and the remote tribal
regions of Pakistan.67 However, U.S. operations are
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continuing to expand in Horn of Africa countries such as
Somalia and Yemen, and beyond.68
IV. “Modeling what Right Looks Like” and the
Consequences when that Doesn’t Happen
I have previously proposed Measures of
Effectiveness (MOE) for AFRICOM,69 addressing
Congressional concerns about each key aspect of force
composition, resourcing, and missions, at a time when
AFRICOM was still forming such standards and assessing
“lessons learned.70 In hindsight, the outgoing first deputy
to the commander for military operations, Vice Admiral
(VADM) Robert Moeller, (Retired (RET)) said, “during
[the command’s] work in designing AFRICOM and
helping guide it through the early years of its existence, a
number of lessons have helped inform our decisions and
ensure we performed our job responsibly and effectively.”71
Those “lessons learned” have equal applicability to
SOCAFRICA as AFRICOM’s sub-unified command:
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Lesson 1: AFRICOM does
not create policy.
Lesson 2: AFRICOM must
work hand in hand with the
diplomatic corps.
Lesson 3: Keep our footprint
in Africa limited.
Lesson 4: AFRICOM is most
effective when it listens to
the concerns of its African
partners.
Lesson 5: Don't
instant results. 72

expect

Each of these aspects contribute to a long-term
vision AFRICOM shares with its African partners, building
capabilities through sustained security programs which,
“over time, help support the conditions for economic
development, social development, and improvements in
health -- so that people will continue to see progress in their
lives and growing prosperity in their communities.”73
Even when these “lessons learned” are heeded, and best
efforts are made to assess and promote adherence to the
highest legal and operational standards, some resulting
circumstances may fall short where exemplifying and
educating “what right looks like” does not happen. For
instance, Malian Army Captain and coup leader Sanogo
“attended an English-language instructor course at the
Defense Language Institute, a special school for
72
73

Id.
Id.
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international military students at Lackland Air Force Base,
Texas, from August 2004 to February 2005,” then “[n]early
three years later, in December 2007, Captain Sanogo
returned to the United States, this time for more English
language classes at Lackland before attending the Army’s
entry-level course for intelligence officers at Fort
Huachuca, Arizona, instruction that he completed in July
2008.”74 Did IMET and other training enhance Sanogo’s
ability to plot and conduct his coup, or deter him from
committing greater human rights violations than he is
accused of having committed? Only time and careful
consideration will tell, as the “green arc of instability” from
the Sahel to the Horn of Africa becomes less stable through
this forcible revolt.75
SOF must also scrupulously demonstrate the highest
legal, ethical, and moral standards in their personal and
professional conduct. What better way to hold the “high
ground” and to encourage those being trained and those
advised to do likewise? Regrettably, as negative exemplars
for African forces and nations within the Area of
Responsibility (AOR), come the consequences of
74
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unprofessionalism
and
criminal
misconduct
by
AFRICOM’s highest uniformed leaders.
Pentagon
inspector general investigators found that former
AFRICOM Commander, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ward
(formerly General (GEN)) spent thousands of dollars on
inappropriate travel expenses,76 and engaged in several
"inappropriate" activities, including “submitting expense
reports with extravagant and unacceptable charges,
inappropriate use of military staff, and misuse of
government funds,” involving "not an insignificant sum of
money;" as a result, Ward was relieved of command (fired),
demoted in rank affecting his lifetime pension, and had a
recoupment of $82,000.77 Less than six months after
Ward’s relief, his outgoing replacement, GEN Carter Ham,
head of AFRICOM, relieved Major General (MG) Ralph
Baker, commander of the CJTF-HOA in Djibouti, of
command on April 4, 2013 and fined Baker a portion of his
pay after an administrative hearing and review.78
AFRICOM officials said Ham lost confidence in Baker's
ability to command because of alcohol and sexual
76
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misconduct
charges
inappropriate contact.79

involving

harassment

and

GEN David M. Rodriguez, one of the Army’s most
battle-tested officers, assumed command of AFRICOM in
April 2013 as Africa confronts a growing threat from
Islamic militant groups operating across the continent, and
refocuses AFRICOM on core missions, implementing
lessons learned, and setting and maintaining the highest
professional and personal standards of conduct.80 He will
need to implement strategies to face threats while
simultaneously setting and maintaining the highest
professional and personal standards of conduct.
V. Conclusion
SOCAFRICA has even greater challenges than
conventional forces in the AFRICOM AOR regarding
physical and political risk, operational techniques, modes
79
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Rodriguez’s vast experience included commands of joint, combined
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tribute to outgoing the outgoing AFRICOM Commander, General
Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lauded Ham
for “principled and grounded leadership,” and for his “steady hand
when times felt very unsteady.” Vandiver, supra; See also Roulo,
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of employment, and dependence on detailed operational
intelligence and indigenous assets; given operational and
training element sizes, locations, defensive postures, and
close engagement with local populaces; and African
government personnel, and host nation military forces.81
SOF furtherance of human rights and the rule of law, in
every instance, can and must be considered in light of
VADM (RET) Moeller’s “lessons learned,” but also
measured against and meet the Five SOF Mission Criteria:
It must be an appropriate
mission or activity for SOF.
The mission or activities
should support the Joint
Force Commander’s (JFC’s)
campaign or operation plan,
or special activities. Mission
or tasks must be operationally
feasible, approved, and fully
coordinated.
Required
resources must be available
to execute and support the
SOF mission. The expected
outcome of the mission must
justify the risks.82
As I have previously written, the effective use of
SOF will likely mean fewer in extremis requirements for
direct action or targeted killing of terrorists and other
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persons threatening U.S. national security like bin Laden.83
SOCAFRICA will play an indispensible role in aiding
African nations with “foreign internal defense” missions;
that is, “participation by civilian and military agencies of a
government in any of the action programs taken by another
government or other designated organization to free and
protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,
insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”84
As challenges in Africa arise and continue, so too will
AFRICOM’s need for SOF increase, utilizing these highly
trained, culturally astute, superbly disciplined uniformed
service members to promote and maintain a vigilant and
active peace.85 In this manner, rather than targeting the
symptomatic expressions of terror, the United States will
instead prescriptively promote the rule of law abroad as one
of many measures to eliminate the root causes of terrorism,
while maintaining the capability to deliberately and
carefully tailor uses of authorized, licit force around the
world.
Operating in joint, combined, and interagency
operations, SOCAFRICA can and will promote
“democracy, opportunity, health, and the peaceful
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resolution of conflict”86 as SOF “diplomat-warriors”
coordinate and synchronize U.S. military activities with
U.S. diplomatic and economic objectives in Africa.87

86

Speeches & Remarks, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President to the Ghanaian Parliament, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (July 11,
2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentghanaianparliament?utm_soure=wh.gov&utm_medium=shorturl&utm_
campaign=shorturl.
87
Govern, supra note 1, at 285.
183

